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Abstract	
This	 paper	 aims	 to	 provide	 a	 summary	 of	 some	 of	 the	 key	 issues	 outlined	 in	 my	 recent	
publication	Realist	Criminology	(2014a).	It	discusses,	in	particular,	the	perceived	deficiencies	
of	 both	mainstream	 and	 critical	 criminology	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 explanations	 of	 the	 crime	
drop.	 It	 argues	 that	 the	 failure	 of	 criminologists	 to	 provide	 a	 convincing	 and	 plausible	
explanation	 of	 the	 recent	 decrease	 in	 recorded	 crime	 in	 Britain,	 North	 America	 and	 other	
countries	has	resulted	 in	a	new	aetiological	crisis.	 It	 is	suggested	that	 the	 failure	to	explain	
what	is	arguably	the	most	significant	development	in	relation	to	crime	in	living	memory	is	no	
accident,	 but	 rather	 a	 function	of	 the	 theoretical	 and	methodological	 inadequacies	 that	 are	
prevalent	in	academic	criminology.	
	
Keywords	
Realism;	Left	Realism;	critical	criminology;	crime	drop;	aetiological	crisis.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Please	cite	this	as:	
Matthews	 R	 (2016)	 Realist	 criminology,	 the	 new	 aetiological	 crisis	 and	 the	 crime	 drop.	
International	 Journal	 for	 Crime,	 Justice	 and	 Social	 Democracy	 5(3):	 2‐11.	 DOI:	
10.5204/ijcjsd.v5i3.343.	
	
	This	work	is	 licensed	under	a	Creative	Commons	Attribution	4.0	Licence.	As	an	
open	access	 journal,	articles	are	 free	 to	use,	with	proper	attribution,	 in	educational	and	other	
non‐commercial	settings.	ISSN:	2202‐8005	
Roger	Matthews:	Realist	Criminology,	the	New	Aetiological	Crisis	and	the	Crime	Drop	
	
IJCJ&SD							3	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2016	5(3)	
Introduction	
Writing	Realist	Criminology	(2014a)	was	motivated	by	a	number	of	considerations.	First,	it	had	
been	 the	 intention	 in	 the	1990s	 to	 summarise	 the	main	arguments	of	 realist	 criminology	 into	
one	accessible	text	and,	although	Jock	Young	and	I	published	two	realist	collections	in	the	1990s	
–	Issues	 in	Realist	Criminology	(1992)	and	Rethinking	Criminology:	The	Realist	Debate	 (1992)	–	
neither	book	provides	a	general	introduction	or	overview	of	the	realist	perspective.	Jock	Young	
published	a	number	of	 articles	outlining	some	of	 the	key	 features	of	what	was	known	as	Left	
Realism,	which	 identified	 some	of	 the	major	differences	between	Left	 realist	 criminology	 and	
the	dominant	forms	of	conventional	criminology	(see,	for	example,	Young	1992,	1997).	
	
Secondly,	the	debate	in	criminology	has	moved	on	over	the	past	two	decades	and	it	is	therefore	
necessary	 to	 make	 a	 more	 up‐to‐date	 statement	 about	 the	 limitations	 and	 challenges	 facing	
criminology.	A	key	factor	of	the	development	is	the	 increased	dominance	of	different	forms	of	
liberalism	within	criminology.	A	disturbing	 feature	of	contemporary	criminology	is	the	way	in	
which	the	distinctions	between	critical	and	liberal	criminology	have	become	blurred	and	critical	
criminology	 has	 in	 many	 respects	 lost	 direction	 and	 impact.	 In	 writing	 Realist	 Criminology	
(2014a)	the	task	was	to	identify	the	limits	of	liberalism	and	to	develop	a	stance	that	is	not	anti‐
statist	or	anti‐punishment	but	rather	one	that	works	both	‘in	and	against’	the	state	in	order	to	
take	crime,	victimisation	and	punishment	seriously.		
	
In	its	original	formulations	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	Left	Realism	provided	an	essentially	political	
response	 to	 the	 liberal‐conservative	 consensus	 in	 criminology.	 In	 doing	 so	 it	 aimed	 to	 link	
theory	and	practice	in	order	to	provide	the	basis	for	the	development	of	a	Left	social	democratic	
response.	 However,	 on	 reflection	 it	 did	 not	 pay	 enough	 attention	 to	 questions	 of	 theory,	
epistemology	 and	 methodology.	 Although	 critical	 of	 positivism	 and	 a‐theoretical	 forms	 of	
administrative	criminology	on	one	hand,	and	 the	conservative	 ‘broken	windows’	approach	on	
the	 other,	 questions	 of	 theory	 and	method	 remained	 largely	 underdeveloped	 (Jones,	McLean	
and	Young	1986;	Kinsey,	Lea	and	Young	1986).		
	
Significantly,	in	recent	years	there	have	been	developments	of	Critical	Realism	associated	with	
the	works	of	Roy	Bhaskar	 (1975),	Margaret	Archer	 (1995),	Andrew	Sayer	 (2000)	and	others,	
which	has	provided	 a	more	 sophisticated	 approach	 to	 social	 scientific	 investigations.	Andrew	
Sayer’s	 work	 in	 particular,	 drawing	 on	 Marxist	 methods,	 has	 provided	 a	 much‐needed	
contribution	 to	 both	 the	 development	 of	 social	 theory	 and	 method	 (Sayer	 2010).	 Thus,	 the	
integration	 of	 the	 insights	 of	 Critical	 Realism	 and	 Left	 Realism	 is	 the	 third	 aim	 of	 the	 book,	
which	has	the	objective	of	placing	the	realist	project	on	a	firmer	conceptual	and	methodological	
foundation.	
	
A	 fourth	 objective	 of	 the	 book	was	 to	 examine	 and	 interrogate	 the	 richness	 and	 subtleties	 of	
cultural	 criminology.	 Cultural	 criminology	 has	 provided	 a	 much	 needed	 impetus	 to	 the	
development	 of	 critical	 criminology.	 However,	 it	 has	 been	 accused	 of	 having	 idealist	
associations,	 a	 lack	 of	 appreciation	 of	 victimisation	 and	 little	 interest	 in	 policy	 developments	
(O’Brien	 2005).	 Thus	 one	 of	 the	 central	 chapters	 of	 the	 book	 aims	 to	 try	 to	 integrate	 the	
contributions	of	both	cultural	and	realist	criminology	and	produce	a	form	of	critical	criminology	
that	might	be	termed	Cultural	Realism	(Matthews	2014b).		
	
The	fifth	reason	for	writing	Realist	Criminology	(2014a)	was	to	contribute	to	the	development	of	
a	 ‘public	criminology’	 that	aims	 to	make	criminology	more	socially	and	politically	 relevant.	 In	
previous	publications,	I	have	developed	the	term	‘So	What?’	criminology	to	identify	those	forms	
of	criminology	that	are	thin	theoretically,	adopt	an	inappropriate	methodology,	and	have	little	
or	no	policy	relevance	(Matthews	2009)	I	have	argued	that	the	combination	of	these	deficiencies	
seriously	detracts	from	the	possibility	of	developing	a	‘public	criminology’	and	is	likely	to	result	
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in	a	criminology	that	had	limited	social	or	political	value.	Thus	a	central	argument	in	the	book	is	
the	need	to	develop	a	‘joined	up’	criminology	that	can	link	theory,	method	and	policy.		
	
The	book	itself	has	two	parts.	One	part	aims	to	provide	a	framework	and	guide	to	doing	realist	
criminology.	 The	 second	 part	 provides	 a	 critique	 of	 two	 of	 the	 dominant	 tendencies	 in	
contemporary	criminology:	liberal	and	administrative	criminologies.	One	of	the	examples	of	the	
limitations	of	contemporary	criminological	approaches	that	is	given	in	the	book	is	the	so‐called	
‘crime	drop’	which	refers	to	the	remarkable	decrease	in	recorded	crime	that	has	taken	place	in	
the	UK,	the	US	and	at	least	ten	other	countries	over	the	past	two	decades.	The	crime	drop	was	
not	predicted	and	criminologists	have	found	it	very	difficult	to	explain	what	is	undoubtedly	the	
most	significant	development	in	crime	in	living	memory.		
	
Some	years	ago,	Jock	Young	(1997)	made	reference	to	the	‘aetiological	crisis’	and	the	inadequate	
explanations	 that	 criminologists	 provided	 for	what	 appeared	 to	 be	 the	 inexorable	 increase	 in	
crime.	Now	that	crime	has	decreased	dramatically	we	have	arguably	a	new	aetiological	crisis	as	
criminologists	 from	 various	 persuasions	 have	 been	 unable,	 to	 date,	 to	 develop	 a	 convincing	
explanation	 of	 this	 dramatic	 change.	 This	 paper	 aims	 to	 provide	 an	 overview	 of	 the	ways	 in	
which	different	criminologists	have	 tried	 in	recent	years	 to	address	 the	question	of	 the	crime	
drop	on	 the	presumption	 that	 an	 indicator	 of	 the	 health	of	 a	 subject	 area	 lies	 in	 its	 ability	 to	
explain	the	most	significant	developments	in	its	field	of	enquiry.		
	
The	aetiological	crisis	
In	 his	 influential	 depiction	 of	 the	 ‘aetiological	 crisis,’	 Jock	 Young	 (1997)	 pointed	 out	 that,	 on	
both	 sides	 of	 the	 Atlantic	 between	 the	 1960s	 to	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1980s,	 crime	 continued	 to	
increase	despite	periods	of	 full	employment	and	decreasing	 levels	of	poverty	and	deprivation.	
This	would	seem	to	undermine	liberal	arguments	about	the	causes	of	crime.	At	the	same	time	
the	observation	that	recorded	crime	continued	to	increase	in	both	Britain	and	the	US	despite	the	
significant	 growth	 of	 incarceration	 served	 to	 undermine	 the	 conservative	 claims	 that	 getting	
tough	on	crime	would	serve	to	reduce	it.		
	
In	Young’s	view,	the	various	theoretical	explanations	for	the	apparently	inevitable	rise	in	crime	
were	found	wanting,	and	although	some	explanations	proved	to	be	more	plausible	than	others,	
none	 of	 the	major	 theories	were	 found	 to	 be	 able	 to	 provide	 a	 comprehensive	 or	 consistent	
explanation.	 What	 concerned	 Young	 most	 was	 that	 this	 lack	 of	 explanatory	 power	 was	 not	
restricted	 to	 the	 conventional	 forms	 of	 liberal	 and	 conservative	 criminology	 but	 was	 also	
evident	 amongst	 critical	 and	 radical	 criminologists.	 It	 was	 Young’s	 central	 task	 to	 develop	 a	
viable	critical	criminology	that	could	address	the	major	issues	of	the	day	and	provide	a	credible	
alternative	to	mainstream	criminology	(see	Young	2013).	If	critical	criminology	was	to	compete	
successfully	 with	 conventional	 criminology,	 the	 implication	 is	 that	 it	 needed	 to	 provide	 a	
credible	 explanation	 for	 the	 apparently	 relentless	 increase	 in	 crime.	 Although	 such	 an	
explanation	never	fully	materialised,	 it	was	clear	that	the	dominant	criminological	approaches	
including	positivism,	subcultural	theory,	strain	theory,	control	theory,	and	labelling	theory	were	
all	 deficient	 in	 this	 respect.	 The	 bankruptcy	 of	 these	 theoretical	 approaches	 signalled	 the	
limitations	of	criminological	theory	and	paved	the	way	(unfortunately)	for	the	rise	in	forms	of	
administrative	criminology.		
	
The	crime	drop		
However,	 since	 the	 early	1990s	 in	Britain,	 the	US	 and	 a	number	 of	 other	 countries,	 recorded	
crime	 has	 decreased	 significantly	 year	 on	 year.	 This	 systematic	 decrease	 was	 not	 only	
unpredicted	but	for	a	number	of	years	it	remained	unacknowledged	amongst	the	criminological	
community.	 In	 fact,	 there	was	 no	 serious	 commentary	 on	 this	major	 development	 until	 2000	
with	 the	 publication	 of	 Alfred	 Blumstein’s	 and	 Joel	Wallman’s	 edited	 collection	 on	The	Crime	
Drop	in	America.	The	various	contributors	to	the	book	tried	to	identify	the	primary	cause	of	the	
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crime	drop.	The	development	of	mass	incarceration,	changing	forms	of	policing,	the	role	of	guns	
and	patterns	of	drug	use	are	all	presented	as	leading	contenders	in	the	search	for	a	prime	cause.	
Most	of	the	contributors,	however,	provide	equivocal	conclusions.	William	Spelman	(2000),	for	
example,	in	his	examination	of	the	role	of	incarceration	concludes	by	saying	that	imprisonment	
‘was	 a	 contributing	 factor’	 to	 the	 crime	 drop	 and	 then	 goes	 on	 to	 say	 that	 most	 of	 the	
responsibility	 for	 this	 decrease	 rests	with	 improvements	 in	 the	 economy,	 changes	 in	 the	 age	
structure,	and	other	unexamined	social	factors.		
	
Focussing	 on	 the	 role	 of	 policing	 in	 relation	 to	 violent	 crime,	 John	 Eck	 and	 Edward	Maguire	
(2000)	provide	a	similar	set	of	equivocal	conclusions.	While	the	authors	credit	the	police	with	
having	 some	 impact	 on	 violent	 crime,	 the	 degree	 of	 impact	 is	 unspecified.	 They	 did	 add,	
however,	 that:	 ‘the	 most	 plausible	 explanation	 is	 that	 police	 actions	 interacted	 with	 other	
criminal	justice	policies’.	The	‘other	policies,’	however,	remain	unspecified,	as	does	the	nature	of	
the	proposed	interaction.		
	
Other	chapters	in	the	book	are	similarly	inconclusive	and	we	remain	no	clearer	at	the	end	of	the	
book	about	the	causes	of	the	crime	drop	than	we	were	at	the	beginning.	What	is	also	evident	is	
that	 the	 authors	 and	 editors	 of	 the	 book	 also	 seem	 impervious	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 similar	
developments	have	been	taking	place	in	the	UK	and	other	countries	which	have	not	experienced	
mass	 incarceration,	 US‐style	 policing	 practices,	 or	 the	 problems	 associated	 with	 gun	 use.	 An	
international	 perspective	 on	 the	 crime	 drop	 may	 have	 injected	 some	 refinement	 into	 the	
analysis.		
	
In	 the	 same	 year	 Andrew	 Karman	 (2000)	 produced	 a	 more	 thoughtful	 and	 well	 researched	
account	of	 the	crime	drop	 in	New	York.	The	book	set	out	 to	 review	the	role	of	 imprisonment,	
drug	 control,	 changing	 demographics	 and	 policing	 on	 the	 homicide	 rate	 in	 New	 York.	 He	
questioned	the	claims	that	zero	tolerance	policing,	and	other	changes	that	took	place	in	the	era	
of	 the	 former	Mayor	Giuliani	were	responsible	 for	 the	decrease	 in	homicide	 in	particular,	and	
the	crime	drop	in	general.	Karman	pointed	out	that	crime	dropped	in	a	number	of	other	North	
American	 cities	 that	 had	 adopted	 very	 different	 policing	 strategies.	 Despite	 providing	 a	
perceptive	critique	of	many	of	 the	dominant	explanations	 for	 the	crime	drop	 in	New	York,	he	
concludes	with	the	statement	that:	
	
The	best	way	to	describe	the	city’s	situation	in	the	1990s	was	that	a	 ‘fortuitous	
confluence’	of	underlying	factors	materialised.	Luckily	for	city	residents	–	and	for	
those	in	a	position	of	authority	and	trust	–	every	one	of	the	causal	factors	known	
to	affect	crime	rates	moved	in	the	same	direction.	(Karman	2000:	259)	
	
If	 it	was	the	case	that	all	of	the	known	factors	were	moving	in	the	same	direction,	 it	might	be	
reasonably	assumed	that	there	is	some	underlying	generic	causal	mechanism	that	was	driving	
this	 change.	However,	 it	 is	not	 the	 case	 that	 all	 the	possible	 causes	were	moving	 in	 the	 same	
direction	in	all	the	countries	experiencing	a	decrease	in	recorded	crime.	Furthermore,	in	North	
America	 the	high	rate	of	 recidivism,	 the	 fragmentation	of	 communities,	 economic	 fluctuations	
and	other	‘factors’	would	all	seem	to	have	been	pushing	in	another	direction.		
	
John	Conklin	(2003)	also	questions	the	viability	of	a	mono	causal	approach	and	concludes,	like	
Karman,	 that	 a	 range	 of	 ‘factors’	 probably	 came	 together	 but	 claims	 that	 the	 role	 of	
imprisonment	was	the	most	important	reason	why	crime	rates	fell	in	the	1990s.	Using	a	form	of	
regression	analysis,	Conklin	suggests	that	the	problem	is	that	many	of	the	variables	‘defy	easy	
measurement’	and	that	‘the	simplification	of	independent	variables	can	obscure	their	impact	on	
the	 dependent	 variable’	 (Conklin	 2003:	 192)	 The	 real	 problem,	 however,	 is	 to	 know	a	priori	
what	 counts	 as	 an	 ‘independent	 variable’	 and	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 relevant	 independent	
variables	 are	 not	 included	 in	 this	 analysis.	 Although	 there	 is	 a	 widespread	 assumption	 that	
regression	 equations	 are	 virtually	 synonymous	 with	 causal	 analysis,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 case.	
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Regularities	are	not	sufficient	conditions	 for	 the	 identifications	of	 causes.	 In	 fact,	 they	are	not	
even	necessary	 conditions	 (Sayer	2010).	The	perennial	problem	 is	distinguishing	 causal	 from	
contingent	 relations.	 Unsurprisingly,	 after	 listing	 a	 number	 of	 variables	 that	 might	 have	
contributed	to	the	decrease	in	recorded	crime,	Conklin	(2003:	201)	writes:	‘My	hope	is	that	this	
book	contributes	to	an	understanding	of	why	crime	rates	declined	in	the	1990s	and	that	it	will	
generate	 thoughtful	 discussion	 of	 why	 crime	 rates	 fell	 and	 how	 they	 can	 be	 kept	 down	 or	
further	 reduced.’	 Unfortunately	 the	 book	 adds	 little	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 this	 issue	 and	 is	
unlikely	to	stimulate	much	constructive	discussion	about	how	to	reduce	crime	further.		
	
As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 limited	 explanatory	 value	 of	 most	 of	 the	 main	 ‘factors’	 which	 have	 been	
presented	in	these	publications,	other	authors	have	developed	more	imaginative	explanations	of	
the	crime	drop	such	as	the	legalisation	of	abortion,	which	Steven	Levitt	(2004)	argues	reduced	
the	 ‘at	 risk’	 population	 of	 potential	 criminals.	 Franklin	 Zimring	 (2007)	 has	 taken	 issue	 with	
Levitt’s	thesis.	Zimring	argues	that	the	legalisation	of	abortion	thesis	is	limited	by	the	lack	of	fit	
between	 the	 introduction	of	 abortion	 legislation	 and	 the	 beginning	of	 the	 reduction	 of	 crime.	
Also,	other	methods	of	birth	control	were	available	and	probably	widely	used	before	 the	new	
legislation,	which	would	have	reduced	birth	rates	amongst	the	poor.	Most	importantly,	Zimring	
points	to	the	methodological	limitations	of	this	thesis	and	in	particular	the	question	of	causality	
and	the	problem	of	distinguishing	generic	from	contingent	causes.		
	
Zimring	(2007)	himself,	however,	fails	to	offer	a	convincing	alternative	explanation.	Rather,	he	
claims	that	there	is	not	a	single	cause	of	the	crime	drop	and	that	it	was,	he	suggests,	a	 ‘classic	
example	 of	multiple	 causation,	with	 some	 of	 the	many	 conflicting	 causes	 playing	 a	 dominant	
role’	 (Zimring	 2007:	 195).	 However,	 he	 notes	 that	 crime	 declined	 in	 Canada	 over	 the	 same	
period	 as	 in	 the	 US	 although	 economic,	 social	 and	 criminal	 justice	 developments	 were	 very	
different	 in	 Canada	 during	 this	 period.	 Although	 this	 looks	 like	 an	 argument	 against	
parochialism,	 the	decline	 in	Canada	would	appear	 to	undermine	his	 general	 conclusion	about	
the	multi‐factor	nature	of	the	crime	drop.	He	also	fails	to	resolve	the	methodological	problems	
that	he	identifies	in	his	multi‐factor	approach	since	he	does	not	explain	how	these	factors	might	
be	causally	connected.		
	
In	 contrast	 to	 the	multi	 factor	approach,	 some	criminologists	have	 recognised	 that	 the	 steady	
decrease	in	crime	is	almost	certainly	linked	to	wider	developments.	Even	James	Q	Wilson,	who	
is	probably	best	known	for	his	arguments	on	the	need	to	focus	on	minor	crimes,	incivilities	and	
anti‐social	behaviour	(see	Kelling	and	Wilson	1982),	has	recently	suggested	in	an	article	in	the	
Wall	Street	Journal	that:	
	
At	the	deepest	level,	many	of	these	shifts,	taken	together	suggest	that	crime	in	the	
United	States	is	falling	–	even	through	the	greatest	economic	downturn	since	the	
Great	 Depression	 –	 because	 of	 a	 big	 improvement	 in	 the	 culture.	 The	 culture	
argument	may	strike	some	as	vague,	but	writers	have	relied	on	 it	 in	the	past	 to	
explain	both	the	Great	Depression	fall	in	crime	and	the	explosion	of	crime	during	
the	Sixties.	(Wilson	2011:	4)	
	
Although	 Wilson	 notes	 that	 measuring	 and	 examining	 ‘culture’	 raises	 methodological	
difficulties,	he	 is	no	doubt	correct	 that	explanations	based	on	broad	socio‐cultural	 terms	offer	
the	possibility	of	developing	a	more	plausible	and	credible	explanation	of	the	crime	drop	than	
many	 of	 those	 accounts	 that	 have	 been	 offered	 to	 date.	 Again,	 taking	 a	 broader	 cultural	
perspective,	Robert	 Sampson	 (2008)	has	examined	 the	 relation	between	 immigration	and	 the	
crime	drop.	He	has	argued	 in	 line	with	other	researchers	 that	 first	generation	 immigrants	are	
held	to	be	generally	hard	working	and	law	abiding	and	that	the	recent	influx	of	 immigrants	in	
North	 America	 which	 are	 mostly	 Hispanic,	 may	 have	 had	 some	 impact	 in	 diluting	 the	
criminogenic	culture	of	some	US	cities.	Research	on	immigration	and	crime	in	Europe,	however,	
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presents	a	more	mixed	picture,	but	 there	 is	 some	 indication	 that	 the	 involvement	 in	 crime	by	
some	immigrant	groups	is	relatively	low	(Bell	and	Machin	2011).		
	
The	main	 contribution	 to	 the	debate	 about	 the	decrease	 in	 recorded	 crime	 in	 the	UK	 centres	
round	the	presumed	effects	of	the	increasing	use	of	security	and	crime	prevention	methods	over	
the	past	two	decades.	Graham	Farrell	and	his	colleagues	(2011)	have	presented	what	they	refer	
to	as	the	‘security	hypothesis’.	Drawing	on	routine	activities	and	opportunity	theory,	they	claim	
that	the	implementation	of	various	forms	of	crime	prevention	measures	such	as	car	locks,	and	
other	target	hardening	techniques	has	deterred	prospective	offenders.	Although	it	 is	no	doubt	
the	case	that	the	billions	of	pounds	and	dollars	that	have	been	spent	on	security	measures	over	
the	last	two	or	three	decades	have	had	an	impact	on	crime,	the	security	hypothesis	suffers	from	
two	major	limitations.	First,	the	timing	of	the	introduction	of	the	various	security	measures	that	
the	authors	refer	to	do	not	match	up	well	with	the	timeline	of	the	decrease	in	different	forms	of	
crime.	 Second,	 the	 security	 hypothesis	 does	 not	 go	 very	 far	 in	 explaining	 the	 simultaneous	
decrease	in	violent	crime.	Therefore,	as	an	attempt	to	provide	a	comprehensive	explanation	of	
the	 crime	 drop,	 it	 is	 less	 than	 convincing.	 Even	 the	 UK’s	 Home	 Office	 researchers	 remain	
unconvinced	about	the	explanatory	capacity	of	this	hypothesis.	They	state	that:	
	
The	hypothesis	is	largely	silent	on	why	violence	has	fallen	alongside	theft.	And	for	
acquisitive	 crime,	 the	 case	 that	 better	 security	 caused	 the	 drop	 rests	 on	 the	
largely	 untested	 assumption	 that	 car	 immobilisers	 also	 prevented	 or	 deterred	
thieves	 from	committing	other	 types	of	 theft.	Data	suggests	 that	 the	opposite	 is	
equally	 likely	 –	 that	 as	 one	 thing	 becomes	 harder	 to	 steal,	 thieves	 switch	 to	
something	else.	So,	because	all	types	of	theft	fell	markedly	at	the	same	time	in	the	
mid	1990s	it	seems	likely	that	a	change	in	offender	propensity	for	crime	is	more	
likely	to	provide	the	main	explanation.	(Home	Office	2015:	1)	
	
Graham	Farrell	(2013)	has,	however,	in	another	publication	identified	five	tests	that	he	suggests	
any	credible	explanation	of	 the	crime	drop	must	meet.	These	 include,	 first,	whether	 there	are	
reasonable	empirical	grounds	to	consider	the	hypothesis.	Second,	that	the	hypothesis	stands	up	
to	cross‐national	comparisons.	Third,	that	the	hypothesis	is	compatible	with	the	fact	that	crime	
increased	over	previous	decades.	Fourth,	that	it	explains	variations	in	trends	amongst	different	
types	of	crime.	Lastly,	that	the	hypothesis	is	compatible	with	variations	in	the	timings	of	crime	
falls	between	countries	and	crime	types.	Farrell	claims	that	the	only	hypothesis	that	meets	these	
criteria	 is	 the	security	hypothesis.	Nonetheless,	as	suggested	above,	 the	security	hypothesis	 is	
not	only	weak	in	relation	to	timing	of	changes	but	also	fails	to	explain	that,	given	the	variation	in	
the	 introduction	 of	 different	 crime	 prevention	 measures,	 all	 forms	 of	 crime	 appear	 to	 have	
declined	simultaneously.	Thus,	although	the	security	hypothesis	may	go	some	way	to	explaining	
the	decrease	in	car	crime,	it	does	not	explain	variations	in	violence	or	drug‐related	crime	well.	
Moreover,	it	employs	a	mono‐causal	explanation,	which,	as	various	authors	have	pointed	out,	is	
unlikely	to	grasp	the	complex	and	wider	structural	changes	that	are	associated	with	the	crime	
drop.		
	
In	 my	 own	 research	 on	 armed	 robbery,	 for	 example,	 I	 found	 that	 there	 was	 a	 significant	
decrease	in	commercial	robbery	in	the	UK	in	the	1990s	(Matthews	2001).	However,	this	was	not	
associated	with	 the	 introduction	 of	 any	 new	 security	measures	 in	 this	 period.	 In	 fact,	 it	 was	
during	 the	 1980s	 that	 a	 range	 of	 measures	 including	 cameras,	 alarms	 and	 screens	 were	
introduced	in	the	UK.	These	made	little	impact	on	the	number	of	commercial	robberies	during	
this	period.	The	decrease	in	commercial	robberies	in	the	1990s	was	a	function	of	a	cultural	shift	
involving	 the	 demise	 of	 old	 style	 professional	 robbers	 by	 more	 amateur	 and	 spontaneous	
offenders	and	this	also	involved	a	shift	towards	more	accessible	options.		
	
The	other	major	response	 in	the	UK	to	the	decrease	 in	recorded	crime	 involves	a	denial	of	 its	
occurrence	and	a	claim	that	the	apparent	decrease	is	a	function	of	the	manipulation	of	the	crime	
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figures	by	the	key	agencies	or	that	crime	has	not	so	much	decreased	as	been	displaced	and	that	
‘street	 crime’	 and	 ‘normal’	 crime	 are	 being	 replaced	 by	 cybercrime.	 In	 relation	 to	 the	
manipulation	of	the	crime	figures,	there	is	clear	evidence	that	the	police	have	changed	recording	
practices	 in	recent	years	and	have	admitted	 ‘massaging’	 the	crime	 figures.	 In	December	2014,	
the	 gold	 standard	 ‘national	 statistics’	 status	 was	 withdrawn	 from	 the	 police	 in	 England	 and	
Wales	 due	 to	 discovery	 that	 they	 had	 been	 ‘fiddling’	 the	 figures	 (Travis	 2014).	 However,	 the	
continued	and	widespread	decrease	in	a	range	of	crimes	over	time,	particularly	those	where	the	
police	are	able	to	exercise	limited	discretion,	or	where	there	is	not	much	room	for	manipulation	
such	as	car	crime,	robbery	and	serious	violence,	suggests	that	a	significant	decrease	has	taken	
place,	 at	 least	 amongst	 certain	 crime	 types.	 The	 international	 nature	 of	 the	 crime	 drop	 also	
suggests	 that,	 despite	 dubious	 police	 recording	 practices	 in	 the	 UK,	 crime	 is	 decreasing	 in	
different	countries	where	recording	practices	have	remained	relatively	stable.	 In	addition,	 the	
simultaneous	 decrease	 in	 victimisation	 recorded	 by	 the	 Crime	 Survey	 for	 England	 and	Wales	
tends	to	reinforce	the	conception	that	crime	is	decreasing.		
	
In	relation	to	the	increase	in	new	forms	of	cybercrime	there	can	be	little	doubt	that	this	is	taking	
place,	but	it	is	extremely	questionable	that	traditional	forms	of	‘street	crime’	are	being	displaced	
in	 this	way.	Cybercrime	would	 in	all	probability	 increase	 in	 the	current	period	 irrespective	of	
changes	 in	other	 forms	of	 crime.	However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	 cybercrime	 involves	 a	
distinctly	different	group	of	offenders	than	traditional	forms	of	street	crime	as	well	as	having	a	
different	set	of	victims	(McGuire	2016;	Wall	2007).		
	
The	crime	drop	and	criminological	theory	
In	 her	 classic	 but	 often	 overlooked	 text	Women,	 Crime	 and	 Society	 (1982),	 Eileen	 Leonard	
argued	convincingly	that	traditional	criminological	theory	is	incapable	of	explaining	the	nature	
or	 patterns	 of	 female	 crime.	 A	 similar	 critique	 arises	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 attempts	 by	 different	
criminologists	–	drawing	on	these	traditional	theories	–	to	explain	the	crime	drop.		
	
Standard	 liberal	 theories	 that	 attempt	 to	 explain	 the	 crime	 drop	 in	 terms	 of	 poverty,	
deprivation,	unemployment	or	economic	fluctuations	have	proved	to	be	inadequate.	One	of	the	
significant	features	of	the	crime	drop	is	that	it	appears	to	transcend	economic	changes	including	
changes	 in	 the	 level	 of	 unemployment.	 Standard	 versions	 of	 strain	 theory	 appear	 less	 than	
helpful	 in	 this	 respect	 and,	 despite	 the	 increasing	 gap	 between	 the	 rich	 and	 poor	 in	 many	
advanced	countries,	recorded	crime	has	decreased.		
	
Socio‐biological	and	standard	positivist	accounts	appear	largely	irrelevant	and	all	those	theories	
that	 present	 individualistic	 accounts,	 or	 claims	 that	 criminality	 is	 a	 product	 of	 innate	
propensities	or	personal	attributes,	are	difficult	to	take	seriously.	Similarly,	notions	of	anomie,	
although	having	 the	benefit	of	considering	wider	social	and	cultural	 influences,	 fail	 to	capture	
the	nature	of	 shifting	moral	values	 in	 late	modernity.	As	Zygmunt	Bauman	 (1991)	and	others	
have	pointed	out,	 the	era	of	 ‘liquid	modernity’	 involves	new	forms	of	 inclusion	and	exclusion.	
Increasing	social	divisions	occur	alongside	the	search	for	community	and	identity.	It	is	a	world	
of	moral	ambivalence	characterised	by	greater	 tolerance	on	one	hand	and	 indifference	on	 the	
other.	This	is	a	world,	according	to	Jock	Young	(2003),	of	changing	agency	and	structure	and,	as	
he	 suggests,	 the	 art	 of	 criminological	 analysis	 is	 to	 capture	 these	 two	 dimensions	
simultaneously.		
	
Labelling	 theory,	 realists	 have	 argued,	 has	 always	 suffered	 from	 the	 deficiency	 of	 being	 one‐
sided	by	focussing	almost	exclusively	on	the	social	reaction	to	deviance	(Young	1992).	Realists	
instead	have	presented	 the	 ‘square	of	 crime,’	pointing	out	 that	 crime	 is	not	only	an	act	and	a	
reaction	but	also	has	a	number	of	 formal	and	 informal	dimensions	 that	combine	to	create	 the	
phenomenon	of	‘crime’	(see	Lea	1992).	However,	apart	from	this	limitation,	labelling	theory	has	
always	 been	 much	 better	 at	 accounting	 for	 the	 application	 of	 labels	 rather	 than	 their	 non‐
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application.	 Even	 in	 periods	 in	 which	 attempts	 have	 been	 made	 to	 ‘define	 deviance	 down’	
(Moynihan	 1993)	 through	 forms	 of	 diversion,	 the	 use	 of	 cautions	 and	 lesser	 penalties,	 these	
strategies	appear	 to	have	minimal	effect	on	 the	overall	 crime	or	custody	rate	 (Garland	1996).	
Consequently	there	is	little	to	suggest	that	the	crime	drop	has	been	a	formation	of	fundamental	
changes	in	the	application	of	labels	or	simply	an	increase	in	the	level	of	tolerance.		
	
Social	disorganisation	theory	also	appears	to	be	deficient.	Increased	mobility	and	immigration	
in	a	period	of	globalisation	should,	according	 to	 this	perspective,	 result	 in	an	 increased	crime	
rate	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 breakdown	 of	 both	 formal	 and	 informal	 controls.	 The	 demise	 of	 the	
community	 together	 with	 the	 ‘death’	 of	 the	 modern	 family	 alongside	 forms	 of	 economic	
displacement	should,	according	to	social	disorganisation	theory,	lead	to	increases	in	crime.		
	
Finally,	rational	choice,	routine	activities	and	opportunity	theories	have	historically	provided	a	
limited,	 if	 not	 distorted,	 form	 of	 explanation.	 Conceptions	 of	 the	 offender	 as	 a	 rational	 actor	
weighing	 the	 cost	 benefit	 of	 criminal	 involvement,	 has	 always	 been	 an	 exaggeration.	 Cultural	
criminologists	 have	 emphasised	 the	 emotional	 and	 risk‐taking	 nature	 of	 much	 criminal	
involvement	 and	 rejected	 forms	 of	 explanation	 based	 on	 notions	 of	 instrumental	 rationality	
(Hayward	2007).	Routine	activities	theory	suffers	similar	limitations.	It	is	not	so	much	a	theory	
but	 a	 set	 of	 propositions	 that	 claims	 that	 crime	 is	 likely	 to	 occur	 when	 there	 is	 a	motivated	
offender,	attractive	target	and	a	lack	of	appropriate	guardians.	However,	this	is	little	more	than	
a	set	of	tautologies.	We	only	know	that	the	defender	was	motivated,	that	there	was	an	attractive	
target	and	that	there	was	a	lack	of	suitable	guardians	after	the	crime	has	taken	place.	Similarly,	
opportunity‐based	 theories	 do	 not	 account	 for	 the	 planning	 of	 crimes	 or	 the	 differential	
predispositions	 to	 commit	 crime,	 or	 that	many	 individuals	 deny	 given	 opportunities	 (Ekblom	
and	Tilley	2000).		
	
Other	traditional	criminological	theories	and	perspectives	could	be	cited	but	arguably	all	would	
be	found	wanting	in	terms	of	providing	a	plausible	explanation	of	the	crime	drop.	This	means	
that	there	is	little	to	draw	on	from	the	available	body	of	criminological	theory	and	that,	if	we	are	
to	begin	to	try	to	account	for	the	crime	drop,	we	need	to	develop	a	different	type	of	account.		
	
Conclusion		
It	is	evident	from	this	survey	of	the	contributions	to	explanations	of	the	crime	drop	that	we	are	
facing	a	new	aetiological	crisis.	The	criminological	approaches	that	have	been	cited	are	deficient	
in	 many	 respects.	 In	 fact,	 the	 body	 of	 literature	 on	 the	 crime	 drop	 makes	 a	 significant	
contribution	to	‘So	What?’	criminology	providing	at	best	a	partial	explanation	of	the	decrease	in	
recorded	crime.	These	approaches	display	both	theoretical	and	methodological	deficiencies.	The	
end	result	is	that	these	accounts	have	little	or	no	policy	relevance.		
	
The	major	 conceptual	 limitation	 stems	 from	 the	narrow	conception	of	possible	determinants.	
Both	 conservatives	 and	 liberals	 are	 reluctant	 to	 engage	 in	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 wider	 socio‐
economic	and	cultural	processes	that	almost	certainly	underpin	the	crime	drop.	Conservatives	
are	reluctant	to	engage	in	an	analysis	of	 ‘deep	structures’	and	are	more	comfortable	focussing	
on	 the	 immediate	 and	 directly	 observable	 phenomenon.	 Liberals,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 tend	 to	
view	socio‐economic	analysis	as	 a	 form	of	economic	 reductionism	and	prefer	 to	operate	with	
some	form	of	political	reductionism.		
	
A	 critical	 realist	 explanation	 of	 this	 international	 development	 would	 begin	 from	 an	
examination	 of	 the	 shift	 from	 Fordism	 to	 Post‐Fordism	 and	 in	 particular	 the	 decline	 of	
industrialisation	and	the	growth	of	a	service	economy	accompanied	by	increased	national	and	
international	 mobility.	 This	 involves	 patterns	 of	 mass	 immigration	 and	 associated	 cultural	
shifts.	These	developments	 I	would	suggest	have	occurred	alongside	major	changes	 in	gender	
relations	 in	general	and	notions	of	masculinity	 in	particular.	As	we	enter	the	 ‘have	a	nice	day’	
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economy	 and	 cappuccino	 society,	 it	 is	 no	 longer	 desirable	 for	 men	 to	 be	 physically	 tough.	
Instead	 the	modern	man	 is	 cool,	 flexible	 and	 smart.	 In	 addition	we	 are	witnessing	 significant	
changes	in	the	nature	of	social	control	and	modes	of	governance.	
	
It	 is	 from	 this	 conceptual	 vantage	point	 that	we	might	 reasonably	 begin	 to	 explain	 the	 crime	
drop	and	move	beyond	narrow	mono‐causal	accounts	and	multi‐factor	approaches.	It	is	only	by	
providing	 more	 comprehensive	 forms	 of	 causal	 analysis	 that	 can	 identify	 the	 mechanisms	
involved	 that	 we	 are	 able	 to	 move	 beyond	 ‘So	 What?’	 criminology	 and	 develop	 a	 form	 of	
explanation	that	is	both	critical	and	useful.		
	
Towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 book	 (Matthews	 2014a)	 I	 discuss	 the	 decreasing	 social	 and	 political	
significance	of	crime	in	western	societies	and	raise	the	question	of	whether	we	are	becoming	a	
post‐disciplinary	 society	 in	 Foucauldian	 terms.	 In	 contrast	 to	 Jonathan	 Simon’s	 (2007)	
‘Governing	Through	Crime’	thesis,	I	suggest,	following	Giles	Deleuze	(1995),	that	the	emerging	
forms	of	governance	are	shifting	away	from	a	focus	on	the	marginalised	and	the	‘underclass’	to	
more	general	forms	of	social	regulation	that	are	more	comprehensive	and	more	continuous.	
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